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At NE 1158a22-27, Aristotle argues that the virtuous man will pursue friendships with pleasant people, but 
not with people who are useful to him. Ideally, he adds, these friends should, despite being pleasant, also be 
good, since, in this manner, the good man would have all the goods of friendship. The main problem with 
this passage is that the good man desires his friends to be pleasant; or, put it otherwise, that he desires 
pleasant friends. This idea, however, stands on the opposite side of Aristotle’s axiological hierarchy where 
the virtuous man desires, first and foremost, the good, both as a goal in his life as a whole and in his friends, 
in particular. Pleasure is valuable for Aristotle’s ethics, but it only comes second to virtue and the good. In 
the present paper, I will defend Aristotle, by arguing that he may justify the argument of this passage 






 At NE1 1158a22-27, Aristotle argues that the virtuous man will pursue friendships with 
pleasant people, but not with people who are useful to him. Ideally, he adds, these friends should, 
despite being pleasant, also be good, since, in this manner, the good man would have all the goods 
of friendship. 
 The main problem with this passage is that the good man desires his friends to be pleasant; 
or, put it otherwise, that he desires pleasant friends. This idea, however, stands on the opposite side 
of Aristotle’s axiological hierarchy where the virtuous man desires, first and foremost, the good, 
both as a goal in his life as a whole and in his friends, in particular. Pleasure2 is valuable for 
Aristotle’s ethics, but it only comes second to virtue and the good.  
 In the present paper, I will defend Aristotle, by arguing that he may justify the argument of 
this passage without though jeopardizing his precious axiological hierarchy. To this purpose, I will 
provide the following reasons: 
                                                 
1 Ethica Nicomachea. 
2 Pleasure is one of the most important concepts in Aristotle’s ethics. It is actually a crucial element of 
various topics in the NE such as the development of the moral character, virtues, vices, eudaimonia, akrasia, 
and more. For a very good analysis of some of the most prominent issues regarding pleasure-and especially 
the conflict between NE VII 11-14 and X 1-5-see Verity Harte’s (2014: 288-319) recent essay, “The 
Nicomachean Ethics on Pleasure”.  
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(1) Character friendship is ideal for the virtuous agent. This kind of friendship, however, takes place 
extremely rarely. The reason for this is that it is unusual for two people to have reached the same level of 
highly developed moral goodness. Therefore, it is rather unlikely for a good man to meet and befriend 
another agent as good as he is. 
(2) If (1) is true then if the good man does not want to remain friendless he must pursue friendships which 
are valuable, yet, not the most valuable in Aristotle’s axiological hierarchy. In this section, I will argue that 
this desire derives, largely, from the good man’s social and political nature. By this, I mean that he desires, 
by nature, to share his life with others, and especially with friends. But this is merely the initial spark that 
impels the agent to pursue other forms of friendship than the one that occurs between good people. 
(3) In this third section I will clarify how it is likely for the good man to desire pleasant friends without, 
however, this fact influencing his axiological hierarchy. I will suggest that the virtuous agent does not 
consider pleasant just anyone. He values others as pleasant, only if he recognizes in them at least some good 
habits of character which are manifested by the activities that they have chosen to take part in, such as 
athletic activities, music, theater, and other cultured activities.  
 The difference though between the virtuous agent and his friend rests on why each one of 
them values these activities, and each one’s attitude towards these activities. On the one hand, the 
virtuous agent values them as being worthy of doing, and as being part of the good life and 
eudaimonia. Nevertheless, he does not deviate from his attribute of valuing virtuous activity higher 
than any other kind of activity. In contrast, his friend enjoys them for being what they are in that 
they fulfill his life as such, in the sense that he engages, in one or more of these activities, more 
devotedly than the good man does. Moreover, this dissimilarity between the two friends, with 
regard to the reason that they value these activities, is manifest in their attitude towards them as 
well. That is, while the virtuous agent3 will not engage in them with excess, his pleasant friend 
probably will; and this reflects the differences between them concerning their moral characters.   
 I will deploy the present paper in the following order. In the first section, I will discuss the 
problems that arise from the passage at NE 1158a22-27. In sections 2, 3, and 4, I will analyze the 
three corresponding reasons that support my defense of Aristotle.  In the last section, I will conclude 
the present paper. 
 
The Passage at NE 1158a22-27  
 
 The passage from the Nicomachean Ethics that is the most4 significant for our purposes in 
the present essay is the following: 
                                                 
3 Henceforward VA. 
4 I will mainly focus on this passage in the present paper, but I want to note that Aristotle expresses the idea 
regarding the good agent’s desire for pleasant friends in other passages of the NE as well. For instance, at NE 
1169b24-5, he says that the blessedly happy man will not need friends who are useful to him since he already 
has the things, which are good. In addition, he goes on to argue “…he will not need friends because of 
pleasure, or perhaps to a small extent. This is so because his life is already pleasant and he, therefore, does 
not need any imported pleasure” (NE 1169b25-7). 
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The blessed5, too, though they have no need of useful friends, they do need pleasant ones. For they wish to 
spend their lives in the company of others, and while they can bear what is painful for a short time, nobody 
could endure it continuously-not even the Good Itself, if it were painful to him. This is why they seek friends 
who are pleasant. Nevertheless, presumably6 they ought to seek friends who are good as well and good for 
them, because they will then have what friends should have. (NE 1158a22-7) 
 The first thing that someone may notice in this passage7 is that the VA does not need useful 
friends, yet he needs pleasant8 ones (NE 1158a22). This must mean that because pleasure friendship 
is axiologically closer to character friendship, it is, thereby, more valuable than utility friendship. 
Broadie9 puts it nicely when she says “the principle is: for any two sub-types, F1 and F2, the one 
more closely linked with the supreme good is closer to being exemplary of the type.”  
 The idea regarding utility friends is that since they are not pleasant to the VA then it must be 
painful to live with them. Hence, it makes sense for him not to choose them to be his friends.  The 
main reason for not choosing them is, of course, that they are not virtuous. Nevertheless, the fact 
that if he chose them it would be painful also plays a significant role, especially in view of the fact 
that no virtue is involved in them anyway. In our case of pleasant friends, however, the VA’s friend 
is pleasant to him due to, as we will be seeing shortly in the present paper, the worthy activities that 
he chooses to be involved in. 
 We may find a second interesting idea at NE 1158a24-25. Aristotle says here that the blessed 
man would not even stand the Good itself, if it were painful. This passage reminds us of the 
Philebus. Plato argues there that if the chief good were comprised of wisdom, without even a small 
part of pleasure, then it would not be a good that a human would pursue (Philebus 21d-e). This 
implies that even the good man needs sources of pleasure, in order to live a more fulfilled life. Of 
course, in the text that is of interest to us in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle is consistent with this 
position by saying, as we saw, that the VA should preferably try to find friends who are good and 
                                                 
5 We may sometimes understand the blessed (μακάριοι) as οἱ ὄλβιοι, namely, as people who are fortunate, 
rich, better educated, etc. In other words, someone could complain here that the blessed is distinct from the 
eudaimon, and hence, the good man. Nevertheless, this is not true. The two terms are deeply related, and this 
is evident by the fact that Aristotle uses them almost interchangeably at NE IX.9, where he wonders whether 
the eudaimon person will need friends or not. See also footnote 3. 
6 This ἴσως here unveils Aristotle’s intentions in this passage. The point is that the friends that the good man 
seeks should, also be good, apart from being pleasant. Aristotle, however, must have realized the difficulties 
of this endeavor; that is why he implies that, even though this should be the ideal, it is very difficult for 
someone to achieve this. 
7 It is noteworthy, that the problem concerning this passage that I am trying to address in the present paper 
has been neglected in the literature.   
8 In this passage, Aristotle is consistent with what he says at NE 1169b25-7. He argues there that the good 
man does not need utility friendships, but he needs pleasant ones. The point is though that pleasure should 
accompany a good action, and that it should not be my motive for wanting to befriend the other; and this idea 
was also confirmed by NE 1099a15-23. But Aristotle leaves a small frame for pleasure friendships both at 
1158a22-27 and 1169b25-7. 
9 Broadie and Rowe (2002: 142). 
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pleasant. The idea, however, is that he should look for friends who are pleasant, without them 
necessarily being good; or, at least, not perfectly good as Aristotle wants his virtuous agents to be. 
 Additionally, there is a third, and, perhaps, more stimulating idea that is implied by this 
passage. The idea is that the VA can be friends with people who are pleasant to him. This idea is 
thorny since it is opposed to Aristotle’s axiological hierarchy. Specifically, Aristotle divides what is 
lovable in three categories: the good, the pleasant10, and the useful (NE 1155b18-19, 1104b30-1). 
 Based on this division, he identifies three major forms of friendship: (a) between good 
people, (b) between people who are pleasant to each other and, (c) between people who are useful 
to each other (NE VIII.3). The kind of friendship that is apt for the virtuous agent is (a). In this one, 
the virtuous agent loves and wishes good things for his friend’s sake, namely, for him being virtuous 
(NE 1156b6-10). One main difference between loving you for who you are, namely, for being 
virtuous, and loving you for being pleasant or useful to me is that, in the first case, I love you for 
some essential characteristic you have, while, in the latter case, Aristotle calls these characteristics 
that we are fond of as incidental.  
 The point then is that the VA should ideally pursue friendships with other virtuous agents 
since the predominant desire in his life is the good, and this is what he should look for in his 
friends, too. So, if he desires someone to be his friend for being pleasant to him then he is rendered 
unfaithful to the standard of values that constitute the foundations of his virtuous life. The main 
objective, then, of the following three sections, is to defend Aristotle against these unpleasant 
arguments. The subsequent, and first out of three sections, will have to do with the rarity of virtuous 
friendships. 
 
                                                 
10 I have to note here that pleasure may not be as valuable as the good, but it is considerably valuable 
anyway. In Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, for instance, Aristotle argues that pleasure is a good but not 
the good. He cites and endorses an argument given by Plato in the Philebus: ‘If we imagine a life filled with 
pleasure and then mentally add wisdom to it, the result is made more desirable. But the good is something 
that cannot be improved upon in this way. Therefore, pleasure is not the good’ (1172b23-35; see also cf. I.7, 
1097b14-20; for more details on the Philebus arguments, see 20e-22b and60a-61a.). But, for Aristotle, 
pleasure acquires its value depending on the activity that it accompanies. Specifically, pleasures are as 
diverse as activities in kind and in ethical quality (NE 1175a21-1176a29). For instance, the indulgence in 
errant pleasures can lead to distortions in the understanding of the proper end of action (NE 1104b31-35; 
1113a35b2; 1140b12-20). Also, I have to note here that at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, in his 
discussion of the three lives, Aristotle says that the life of pleasure is a “life for beasts” and those who choose 
it are “slavish” (NE 1095b19-20). Nevertheless, this strong disapproval of pleasure seems rather odd and 
surprising when we consider that at NE X.7 he argues that the life of contemplation is the most pleasant of 
all.  On the other hand, pleasure completes or perfects good activity (NE 1174b14-a21). In this case, pleasure 
acquires the highest value it can get because it accompanies the highest kind of activity in humans, viz. 
rational activity. Generally, we should better understand pleasure in view of its connection with goodness 
(Annas, 1981: 285-299) and rational decision (Broadie, 1991: 331-9). In addition, while Aristotle does not 
reduce pleasure to the good, he does regard pleasure as that which completes the good (Bostock 1998: 251-
272; Hadreas 2004: 155-167).  
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The Rarity of Character Friendships 
 
 In this section, I will discuss Aristotle’s view on the rarity11 of character friendship, which is 
expressed in various passages. The first, and perhaps, most noticeable one, can be found at NE 
1156b23-32: 
And what is good without qualification is also pleasant without qualification; but these things are the most 
lovable; hence both the love and the friendship are greatest and best among these friends. One should expect 
such friendships to be rare, since few people are like that. Furthermore, it requires also time and familiarity: 
as the proverb says, they cannot know each other until they have ‘taken salt together’. They cannot accept 
each other as friends, then, or be friends, until each is plainly seen by the other to be lovable and gains the 
other’s trust. Those who quickly do for each other things characteristic of friendship, though they wish to be 
friends, in fact are not, unless they are furthermore lovable, and they know this. For although the wish for 
friendship comes about quickly, friendship does not. 
 In this passage, Aristotle underlines the rarity12 of character friendships. Since few people 
are as good as Aristotle wants them to be, then there is little chance for two people like that to meet 
and become friends. This is true because agents need to spend time together and get deeply familiar 
with each other so that their lovable qualities to be revealed, and, as a result, for their initial and 
superficial relationship to ripen, eventually, into friendship. It is implied here that if the other agent 
turns out to be different from what we thought, relating to certain qualities, then our friendship 
cannot grow any further. In fact, we have reasons to dissolve such a relationship in cases like that. 
This idea, however, is also connected with the notion of goodwill.  
 For Aristotle, goodwill is a characteristic of friendship, but it is not friendship, since we can 
have it towards strangers who do not know about it (NE 1166b30-1). Furthermore, we cannot 
consider it as loving, because there is no intensity about it, or desire. This happens because the two 
latter ones go along with loving (NE 1166b32-3). Loving, as we previously saw, involves 
familiarity, in contrast to mere goodwill, which can be superficial, sudden, and can arise even for 
competitors in athletics contests (NE 1166b34-1167a1). As Aristotle notes, however, goodwill can 
be the beginning of friendship (NE 1167a3-4). It is not friendship, however, since someone can feel 
goodwill towards someone else and wish good things for him, but, he would not bother joining in 
his actions, or getting in trouble on his behalf (NE 1167a8-10). Hence, the idea behind goodwill is 
that even if we are attracted to someone and feel goodwill towards him, this does not mean that we 
                                                 
11  Someone may also check Irwin’s (1999: 279) comment on 1158a15ff; he says: “The remark is closely 
connected with the rarity of good people. Since a person’s goodness does not become clear at once, we need 
both experience (over some length of time) and familiarity (in many situations). Since it is difficult to have 
the right experience and familiarity with many people, the relevant kind of friendship cannot extend to many 
people.” 
12 Aristotle has already stated at NE 1156b24-5 that very few persons are good. At NE 1156b23-32, this idea 
is applied to the case of character friendship.  
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have befriended him yet. To put it another way, in spite of the fact that we might feel goodwill 
towards someone, it takes more than that for this feeling to eventually grow into a desire for the 
other as being our friend. 
 There is a last point I want to stress before I proceed to discuss certain objections against the 
argument of the present section. At 1158a13-14, Aristotle’s idea seems to be that of all the many 
people we meet, not only few of them will be pleasant enough for us to desire to spend time with 
them, but, also, even fewer will, in the end, become our friends. This argument should be 
understood in a similar way as the one that has to do with the rarity of character friendships. The 
idea here though is that it turns out that it is not an easy task for a valuable pleasure friendship to be 
formed as well. Perhaps Aristotle means, not only that it takes time and familiarity for a superficial 
relationship to evolve into friendship, but, also, that even though we will meet many people in our 
lives who are pleasant to us, few of them will, ultimately, be pleasant enough to us in order to 
pursue a deeper relationship with them. 
 The second point I want to make is that in this passage it is implied that those who are not 
good in character should be avoided all the way (cf. IX.3, 1165b15). The idea of this implication 
seems to be that the good man should avoid bad people to be his friends; he should pursue pleasure 
friendships nevertheless. My thoughts regarding this passage will be better unveiled and explored in 
the third major section of the present essay, where I will explain in what way a pleasant friend can 
be suitable for the good man. Before moving on, though, let me first consider two possible 
objections regarding the argument in this section. The first one has to do with a passage at NE 
1158a33-4, and the second has to do with the fact that the rarity of friends is no problem at all, since 
we are supposed to have few friends anyway. Let me begin with the second objection. 
 According to it, the fact that character friends are rare would not be a problem for the VA 
since we are supposed to have few friends. Even though this objection stresses an intuitive point, it 
does not create serious problems for the argument at hand. The reason for this is that the VA knows 
that he should have few friends, since, only in this fashion, can he share his life with those few 
people with whom he has similar interests, character traits, etc. Only with few people can, indeed, 
the VA deepen the relation and build trust. It is impossible, as experience teaches us, to have many 
friends, and yet be able to have a deep relationship with all of them. Nevertheless, exactly because 
he is supposed to have few friends, the rarity of character friends is a problem for the VA. He could 
be spending a lifetime looking for these few people that could be suitable to his level of character, 
and yet it is highly possible that he would fail finding them. Therefore, the point is, as I argue in the 
present paper, that he should befriend pleasant people in the way that I analyze especially in section 
3.  
 Concerning now the first objection, Aristotle says at NE 1158a33-4. Let us see though the 
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whole argument (NE 1158a33-36) and not just this small portion of it: 
Though we have indeed said that the good person is both pleasant and useful at the same time, he does not 
become a friend to a superior unless the latter is superior in virtue as well; otherwise he does not attain 
equality by being proportionately inferior. But superiors like this are rare.  
 In this passage, Aristotle tries to answer to an objection. Specifically, someone could object 
that friends of the preeminent, or powerful, man are at the same time useful and pleasant to him. 
But virtuous men are, simultaneously, pleasant and useful to others. Aristotle responds, however, 
that the good man will become friends with someone who is eminent in power or resources only if 
he is surpassed in virtue by the eminent in power. If this does not occur, then the more prevailing 
figure in power who is surpassed in virtue will not be able to make himself proportionately equal, 
namely, he will not be able to give proportional compensation to the good man. Specifically, as the 
good man concedes to him and the more powerful one, in like manner, the powerful one should 
defer to the good man as the better one of the two. 
 The problem that the first objection raises against the “rarity argument” is, perhaps, that the 
VA would have other chances for valuable friendships without getting into the complications of a 
pleasure friendship. In fact, the VA could become friends with another, eminent in power agent, 
who surpasses him in virtue. He does not, in other words, have to find someone who equals him in 
virtue in order to become friends with him. So, he can even have friends as this one; and, in 
connection with objection (2) that we previously saw, he could be one of those few valuable friends 
that he shares his life with, without having to be expecting, hopelessly, to find an equal to himself to 
befriend. The problem though with this objection is that, even though it makes a good point, 
Aristotle points out that these kinds of friendship between the VA and a powerful man are rare, 
exactly because superiors, like the one he describes at NE 1158a33-36, are rare. And, I want to 
underscore the fact that superiors like that in virtue, are even more uncommon to find than someone 
who is, more or less, as virtuous as the VA is. Therefore, I do not think that his objection is an 
obstacle to the “rarity argument”. 
 
The Political Nature of the Good man and the desire for Pleasure Friendships 
 
 So far, we have seen, roughly, that it is rare for the good man to meet another agent who is 
virtuous, like himself, and thus pursue to befriend him by start spending time with him and trusting 
him. But as I said at the introduction, this cannot stand alone as a sufficient reason in justifying 
Aristotle’s claim that the good man will pursue pleasure friendships. Hence, we need to dig a little 
deeper so that we can better defend Aristotle.  
 To offer this deeper explanation I will refer to a fundamental idea that we witness in 
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Aristotle’s ethical and political writings. He claims, in particular, that man is by nature a political13 
animal.14 We may find some representative illustrations of this idea in a number of passages.15 For 
instance, at NE IX.9 1169b17-19 he says, “No one would choose to be by himself and have all of 
the goods, for a human being is political and by nature lives with others.” In other words, humans, 
and even more so the best ones, will not choose a solitary way of living even if they have all the 
goods in life. Aristotle implies here that human’s natural place is living with others.  
 Now, in another passage, in his Politics this time, he says, “It has been said in our first 
discourses…that by nature human beings are political animals. That is why, even when they do not 
need assistance from each other, they have no less of a desire to live together.” (Pol. III.6 1278b17-
21) What Aristotle says here is even more important than what he says at NE IX.9 1169b17-19. The 
key idea is not only that humans are by nature political animals; Aristotle also puts emphasis on the 
fact that even if people do not need assistance from each other, they still desire to live and spend 
their time together. This means that living with others does not necessarily come out of need for 
them, but out of an inherent desire to be part of a community; out of a natural desire, in other words, 
to share their lives and existence with others. 
 Now, I want to stress one last point before I end this section. The point has to do with the 
fact that humans are by nature political animals. As we have already seen though this claim seems 
to have more of a political, rather than a personal resonance. But this does not seem right. We 
should take Aristotle to mean that this claim holds for both scopes, rather than, for just one of the 
two. Of course, we cannot disregard the teleological purpose of his claim, in the sense that humans 
realize their nature inside a polis. Additionally, however, we should not fail to notice the fact that 
Aristotle lays great emphasis on personal relationships throughout books 8 and 9 of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, which he generically calls friendships; and these are very important for the 
agent’s life regardless of whether someone is completely virtuous or not. In other words, friends are 
necessary for various levels of our daily life as, for instance, in cases where we are enjoying similar 
activities together, benefiting them and practicing, thereby, the virtues, and, more generally, sharing 
our lives with them. At last, we should not overlook the fact that Aristotle considers friends as very 
important external goods, along with political power and wealth, which are indispensable for the 
achievement of eudaimonia (NE 1099a31-2). Hence, we should better take Aristotle to mean that 
humans have a natural need to share their lives with others either in a broad, that is, a political, or in 
                                                 
13 Of course, the idea that human beings are by nature political animals has been sharply opposed by Hobbes 
(1994) in his great work Leviathan and in his De Cive (1983). 
14For some of the most interesting papers that have been written on Aristotle’s idea that humans are by nature 
political animals see: Cooper (1990), Kullmann (1991), Mulgan (1974).  
15 But apart from his ethical and political works, this idea can also be found in his biological works such as in 
Hist. An. I.1 487b33-488a13. 
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a more personal way where the “or” in this disjunction should be better understood as an inclusive 
one. The idea then is that Aristotle’s claim works for the present paper’s argument as well.  
 Before I move on to the next section, however, I want to briefly examine the possible 
connection of the concept of civic friendship with the argument I put forward regarding the political 
nature of man and his consequent desire for social and political ties with other people, and sense of 
belonging to a cooperative whole that shares common goals.  
 Aristotle, both in his Political and in his Ethical works, expresses the idea of civic 
friendship. In the Politics (1280b23-1281a2), he argues that friendship (1280b38) is the source, and 
expresses the nature, of the specific bond between fellow-citizens; and this bond explains, in turn, 
the mutual interest and concern that they show for each other’s qualities, etc. To be more specific, 
he says that, in essence, friendship is the deliberate decision to share our lives with others 
(1280b38-9). Moreover, friendship is responsible for various practices in the polis, such as religious 
festivals, marriages, brotherhoods, and, generally, all those pursuits in which people share their lives 
together (1280b36-38). Aristotle gives us though only a little flavor of what he has in mind 
regarding civic friendship, since he does not explicitly say, in the aforementioned passages that he 
refers exactly to this kind of friendship. Nevertheless, he is more explicit about it in his ethical 
works. 
 In both the EE and the NE, he refers several times to the term civic friendship (πολιτικὴ 
φιλία). In these works, he seems to comprehend the city as a kind of community (κοινωνία) that is 
based upon, as Cooper puts it very accurately, “the friendly interest that the citizens take in one 
another’s qualities of mind and character, as well, of course, as upon their common economic 
interests”.16 In this kind of a community, as Cooper adds, “the way or ways in which the 
government seeks to promote the citizens’ good as a common good will depend upon the specific 
character of the friendship that forms the political bond within it, and the ways in which ‘civic 
friends’ have and do things in common”.17  
 One of the most critical points Aristotle makes about civic friendship, is that it should be 
considered some sort of advantage friendship. But the argument at NE 1158a22-7, refers strictly to 
the possibility of pleasure friendships for the blessedly happy man, and discards utility, or 
advantage, friendships for him. My suspicion then is that at NE 1158a22-7, Aristotle must be 
referring mainly to personal friendships and, not so much, to political ones. Another reason that 
grounds this suspicion rests on the following argument that we have already seen in the present 
section: “It has been said in our first discourses…that by nature human beings are political animals. 
That is why, even when they do not need assistance from each other, they have no less of a desire to 
                                                 
16 Cooper, 1999, 370. 
17 Ibid., 370. 
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live together” (Pol. III.6 1278b17-21). This passage is very useful for our purposes, because it gives 
us space to maneuver regarding the connection of the political nature of man with civic and 
personal friendships. Namely, the fact that someone’s political nature may lead someone to either: 
(1) be part of a political community where he can cooperate with others in a mutually beneficial 
way, or, (2) to a simple living together where no mutual beneficence is involved, helps a lot in 
attributing (2) to NE 1158a22-7, instead of (1). In other words, civic friendship does not seem to 
play some significant role for the comprehension of the political nature of man, as we want to apply 
it for the interpretation of Aristotle’s argument at NE 1158a22-7. 
 
The Good Man’s desire for Pleasant Friends: A defense of Aristotle 
 
 In this last section, I will further defend Aristotle’s assertion that the good man will pursue 
pleasant friends. In particular, having already referred to the two previous reasons that justify his 
claim, what is left now for us is to explain deeper why is another agent-who is not completely 
virtuous-pleasant to the good man. In order to address this central issue of the present paper, we first 
have to answer to certain immediately pertinent and key questions: (1) how should we understand 
pleasure friendships? (2a) in what way can certain pleasant activities bind together two people who 
are axiologically different? (2b) what is the difference between the two agents regarding their 
attitude toward these activities? Let us start with question (1). 
 With regard to how we should understand pleasure18 friendships (1), Aristotle says at NE 
1172a3-8:  
…hence some drink together, some play dice together, others train, or hunt, or philosophize together, each 
kind spending their days together in doing whichever of the things in life most satisfies them; for wishing as 
they do to live a shared life with their friends, they follow and jointly engage in the occupations in which 
they think they are sharing life with others.  
 In this passage, we may notice that pleasant19 friends spend their time and share their life in 
                                                 
18 Aristotle also provides other, pederast (NE 1156b1-2, 1158a10-15, 1159b15-16, 1164a2 ff.) or matrimonial 
(NE 1162A22 ff.) cases of pleasure friendships. I do not think though that these cases should function as the 
main examples of pleasure friendships. Aristotle also admits that love resembles friendship because “the 
lover is eager to share the life of the loved one, although not in the most proper way but in a sensuous 
manner.” (EE 1245a25-6) In this case, however, Aristotle makes a crucial distinction between this kind of 
relationship with friendship and other ones. Love resembles friendship in that the lovers want to share their 
life with one another, but their attraction is focused on sensuous pleasure. We should not claim, however, that 
either the passages in the Nicomachean Ethics, or the one in the Eudemian Ethics, reflect more deeply 
Aristotle’s view of pleasure friendships than in other cases where two people may enjoy each other’s 
company in a different way (contra Nehamas, 2010: 231).  
19 Concerning pleasure friendships, commentators of Aristotle usually understand this kind of relationship in 
the sense of amusing companions (Pakaluk 2005: 267), people who enjoy each other’s company (Bostock 
2000: 169), drinking companions (Cooper 1999: 318), or even squash partners (Broadie &Rowe 2002: 58). 
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doing various things20 together. Aristotle also implies that they share their life and time with people 
who are similar21 to them in that they both enjoy these activities. As we will see in the answers of 
questions 2(a) and 2(b), it really matters that these activities should be valuable enough so that the 
VA will choose to take part in them. They are not, of course, as valuable as the pleasures of 
contemplation and virtue, but, as we have already seen, it is quite uncommon for the VA to find 
another agent who ranks these activities as the highest in his axiological scale. Let us proceed now 
to answer question (2a). 
 I will first remind the reader question (2a):  in what way can certain pleasant activities bind 
together people who are axiologically different? In order to answer this question, we must explore 
deeper into the nature of these activities, and, therefore, their corresponding pleasures. Now the 
pleasures that we have seen at NE 1172a3-8 (dice, hunting, etc.) along with other ones, for example, 
as Broadie says, those of “…say, debate and conversation, of friendship, of sport, of rule-governed 
play in general, of the arts, of designing things well and crafting them…” (1991, 317) can, as she 
goes on to add “and should be objects to which we are drawn by pre-reflective inclination, having 
through culture, an affinity with them like a hungry animal’s affinity with its food” (1991, 317). In 
my paper I was deeply influenced by Broadie in taking her examples of pleasures, and the ones I 
use as indicative of what she calls “cultured pleasures” (p. 317).  
 Specifically, Broadie’s idea that we just saw in the quoted passage is useful for the purposes 
of our endeavor. Namely, these “cultured pleasures” can work as common ground between the VA 
and his pleasant friend in that they both enjoy these activities which are not valuable just for one of 
them, but for both, since, as Broadie says, people have a natural sympathy or affinity towards them 
through culture. The point is that even if the VA’s friend is not completely virtuous, the former can 
still desire the latter in terms of being similar in that they both enjoy certain cultured activities. 
What remains now is to answer question (2b). 
 This question has to do with the differences between the VA and his pleasant friend. I will 
suggest that the difference between them has to do with: (a) why each one enjoys these activities, 
and, (b) each one’s attitude toward these activities. In order to understand (a), let us consider each 
friend in turn. The VA will enjoy these activities as being part of the good life and will probably 
consider, especially some of them, such as music and involvement in sports, as a vehicle through 
which he may practice and sustain the virtues. For instance, at Pol. VIII.5 1339b13-15, Aristotle 
                                                 
20 The activities that the agents share with each other may also have to do with music (NE 1175b3-5), the 
theatre (NE 1175b12), and athletic activities (Pol. VII.12 1331a36, VIII.3 1338b6-7) 
21 For the idea that, similar agents are attracted to each other, see Aristotle’s Rhetoric 1371b12-17. For more 
on this argument see: Vakirtzis (2018), “Similarity, Pleasure, and the Explanation of our Choices of Friends” 
(unpublished manuscript). 
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says that music22 is valuable because it promotes education, provides amusement23, and is the 
proper way to spend one’s leisure time. He develops these ideas more fully at Pol. VIII.3 1337b28-
1338a13 and throughout Pol. VIII.5. Because of the close connection between well-being and 
leisure (Pol. VIII.3 1337b28-1338a13), it is this last role of music that is most essential.  
 On the other hand, we also understand that our involvement in some sort of physical training 
will benefit the health of the body. Aristotle knows this, of course, and he therefore says that the city 
should provide gymnasia and physical training (Pol. VII.12 1331a36, VIII.3 1338b6-7) for its 
citizens. He is critical, however, of the way athletes are trained (Pol. VII.16 1335b5-7, VIII.4 1338 
b9-11). Specifically, he says that the city should forbid the somewhat excessive and distorted 
physical development that helps athletes triumph in the contests in which they participate but 
impedes military fitness.  
 I have to note here that there is a common idea that lies beneath the examples of music and 
athletic activities that we just saw. In the case of music, for instance, we may imagine the VA 
engaging into activities such as, playing a musical instrument, attending jazz festivals or classical 
music concerts, because they are part of the good life, and because they are beneficial for his soul’s 
virtuous condition. Most of all, we could say, he does not value these activities as the most essential 
in his life. Instead, virtuous activity (or rational activity) is the most highly valued activity in his 
life, and, of course, the most pleasant.  
 Now, his pleasant friend enjoys these activities as well. But there is an important 
dissimilarity concerning his justification of enjoyment and that of his virtuous friend’s. That is, a 
pleasant friend is probably someone who has formed some good habits of character in enjoying 
these activities. But the fact that he has formed some good habits does not mean that he is 
completely good, as his virtuous friend is. He might value one (or all) of these activities because he 
considers them to be as the most valuable in his life. Specifically, he could be a professional athlete, 
or a teacher of piano, or the violin. Therefore, he will not value these activities as part of the good 
and eudaimon life as the VA does, and this is reflected on his attitude towards these activities (b) as 
well, as we will see in what follows. 
 Now, the attitude of each agent towards these activities is an additional level of dissimilarity 
between them. The difference between them rests on how excessively each one engages in them. It 
is obvious that the VA will not consume himself in, say, playing a musical instrument for 8 hours a 
day or training for several hours in the palaestra. These are noble activities, but he will take part in 
them in an intermediate fashion: he will devote to each activity its due time without excess. On the 
                                                 
22 For more details on the benefits of music see, Kraut, 2002: 38, 81, 198-199, p. 201, n.22, 202, 207, 237. 
23 There are, of course, other benefits of music as well, as, for example, to purification (Pol. VIII.7 1341b38-
41), and the fact that it contributes, in some way, to wisdom (1339a25-26). 
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other hand, the VA’s pleasant friend will have a more immoderate attitude towards these activities. 
He could be a very good athlete who participates in athletic contests, or a very good teacher of 
classical guitar. In this way though, he would be devoting too much time in these activities. This 
means that he considers these activities as the most pleasant and valuable in his life.  
 The bottom line then is that the two pleasant friends agree on the fact that they both enjoy 
these activities, but they disagree on the why they enjoy them which is then reflected on each one’s 
attitude towards them. This shows that the VA enters a pleasure friendship without changing his 
character; without altering, in other words his axiological hierarchy.  
 Before closing this section and proceed to the conclusion of the present paper, I briefly want 
to refer to Sarah Broadie once more. She says that the fact that someone develops the ability to 
value these cultured pleasures is part of the development of moral virtue (1991, p. 317). She goes on 
to add, however, that it is not necessary for someone to be virtuous24 in order to enjoy these 
activities, and that someone with a defective character could enjoy them as well. In addition, one’s 
enjoyment -especially the VA’s- is not that different, after all, from those who have a defective 
character (1991, p. 317).  
 I am in partial agreement with Broadie.25 The reason for this is that, in our case, even though 
the VA and his pleasant friend both enjoy the same cultured activities, they are not doing so for the 
same reasons, or with the same attitude. Moreover, these dissimilarities between them reveal 
exactly their difference in character. I want to highlight though the fact that we will not judge the 
VA for his character from the fact that he feels pleasure from these cultured activities. What we 
must really pay attention to is that he feels pleasure from doing virtuous actions, or, to put it another 
way, the virtuous activity of his soul. But the fact that he also enjoys certain worthy activities along 
with another agent, who is not completely virtuous like himself, allows him to form a pleasure 




 In this paper, I presented an argument with the purpose of defending Aristotle against the 
jeopardizing effects of the argument at NE 1158a22-27. In this passage, Aristotle argues, roughly, 
that the VA will avoid friendships based on utility but he will pursue friendships with people who 
                                                 
24 Brodie says: “to be established in virtue” (1991, 317). I take her to mean an agent who is completely 
virtuous in an Aristotelian way.  
25 Broadie concludes that it “would be misleading, therefore, to say on this ground that the virtuous person 
takes pleasure in his virtuous actions.” (1991, 317). She examines this issue deeper in the pages that follow 
(317 ff.), but I will not try to contribute any ideas to this difficult discussion since there is no need to do so 
for the present paper. 
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are pleasant. As we saw, the first, most important, and immediately noticeable issue in this passage 
is that the VA, someone who is naturally expected to form character friendships with others, wants, 
to our surprise, to pursue pleasure friendships. The problem though with this kind of friendship is 
that it is not apt for the VA’s axiological hierarchy of goods, since he values virtue and the good, 
most of all, and not pleasure or utility.  
 I tried to defend Aristotle against any unpleasant outcomes of this passage by presenting 
three reasons that would illuminate why the VA would have to be led to such an unanticipated 
choice. The three reasons had to do with: (1) the rarity of character friendships, (2) the political 
nature of man, and (3) the similarity between the VA and his pleasant friend in finding certain 
activities as pleasant, but also their dissimilarity regarding why they find them pleasant, and each 
one’s attitude towards them. With the aid of these three reasons, I hope to have saved Aristotle from 
a misinterpretation that could have had serious repercussions for his ethical philosophy. In fact, it 
would have put at risk the status of his moral ideal, namely the good man. But it seems that the 
good man will find the best possible solution, even when it comes to choose his friends; and this 
actually shows that he will follow his rational nature, not messing, in this way, with the values that 
he so diligently and persistently has built in his soul throughout years of moral education. 
 
 
  Andreas Vakirtzis 
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